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Abstract
The impact of sectoral location on the gender earnings gap is important in the context of
Vietnam’s transition into a market-oriented economy. More and more women are seeking
employment in the private sector either in response to retrenchment in the public sector or
in response to increasing economic opportunities in the private sector. We apply the
Appleton et al. (1999) decomposition technique to the Vietnam Living Standards Survey
data collected in 1992-93 and 1997-98, to decompose the gender earnings gap into with-
in sector and between-sector differences. It has found that sectoral location has become
more important in 1997-98 and that the changes have had an adverse impact on the
gender gap. To further examine the results, conventional decomposition methods are used
on different sectors. Three main conclusions are drawn. First, the absolute gender
earnings gap has risen over time in the private sector. Second, discrimination has
increasingly accounted for more of the gender earnings differences in the private sector
over time. Third, discrimination accounts for more of the gap in the private sector than in
SOEs in 1997-98 than in 1992-93.
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1. Introduction
The deterioration in labour market outcomes and the polarisation between gender
groups within the economy are key issues facing Vietnam at the present time. The impact
of sectoral location is of particular importance in Vietnam in the context of the ongoing
transition towards a market-oriented economy. The government has been under pressure
to reduce the size of the public sector.1 Moghadam (1994), Standing & Fisher (1993), and
Rueschemeyer (1993) and reports of the Non-Government Organisation (NGOs) suggest
that a disproportionately large number of women are dismissed from the public sector,
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in particular and have to turn to the private sector. Others
argue that more women have left the public sector because they are attracted to the
private sector as more economic opportunities have opened up. Regardless whether it is
voluntary or involuntary, it is apparent that more and more women are moving into the
private sector during the transitional phase. What is the implication of such a change on
the gender earnings gap in Vietnam? Will the gender earnings gap widen or narrow?
Focusing on wage earners, this paper extends existing research in several aspects.
First, economic theory suggests that the gender wage gap may be caused by employers’
tastes that could be shaped by traditional values (Becker 1957; Bergmann 1974; Blau &
Beller 1988; Blinder 1973; Gill 1992; Johnson & Solon 1986; Brown, Moon & Zoloth
1980; Oaxaca 1973; Sloane 1990; Sorensen 1989). Studies on wage disparity between
males and females have rarely conducted for transitional economies. The quantitative
dimensions of the various causes of unequal wages are not well known. Does the degree
of marketisation have a role to play? No research has been directed to this issue in
Vietnam at all.
Second, this paper applies the decomposition technique of Appleton et al. (1999)
which incorporates the impact of sectoral location in addition to the conventional
decomposition methods to examine the gender earnings disparities within each sector.
Standard decomposition techniques decompose gender earnings gap into differences in
returns due to differences in characteristics and differences in returns due to employers’
                                                                
1  Public sector refers to both the government sector and the SOEs throughout the paper.
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tastes. Yet traditional decomposition methods fail to account for differences in sectoral
structures between gender groups. Brown, Moon & Zoloth (1980) propose a
decomposition method to account for sectoral differences between males and females.
However, their decomposition methods are subjected to index number problem. The
method of Appleton et al. (1999) overcomes this problem.
Third, the two Vietnam Living Standards Surveys conducted in 1992-93 and
1997-98 allows this paper to devote special attention to the changes of gender earnings
differentials and the changes of sectoral location impact on female labour outcome over
time. There has been no study on gender differences in earnings, especially on the factors
accounting for changes over time in the earnings gap in Vietnam.
Fourth, the pursuit of this paper is not only important in the Vietnamese context
but can also contribute to the emerging body of literature in other transitional economies
where increasing inequality in labour outcomes has become apparent. A widening gender
earnings gap was reported in Russia during the market reform (Brainerd 1998). Similarly,
in their study of urban China, Gustafsson & Li (forthcoming) found that the unexplained
part of the gender earnings gap has increased slightly over the post-reform period of 1988
to 1995.2
2. Background: Vietnam in transition
A multi-sector economy in transition
Before the 1980s, Vietnam was a centrally planned economy. Under this system,
all the economic activities were planned and controlled by the government. Private
ownership was considered as ‘evil’. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and co-operatives
were the only two types of production units in this era.  Raw material was provided by
the government and production targets for commodities were set. The outputs produced
were sold at planned prices. The labour market was no exception. Based on the overall
plan laid down by the government, the number of workers were decided for each
                                                                
2 China has been undertaking market reform since 1978.
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organisation by respective administrative units. A salary budget was given to each
organisation and workers were paid by a pre-determined salary scale.
The inefficiency of the centrally planned system resulted in the collapse of many
SOEs, forcing the government to embark on market reform. The extensive economic
reform program in 1979 started Vietnam's struggle to resolve the economic crisis
resulting from years of central planning. In early 1981, the role of the private sector was
implicitly accepted as a legal form of ownership. Doi Moi, meaning renovation, unveiled
in 1986, represented a significant step in the transformation towards a market-oriented
economy. One important feature during the transition has been the development of a
multi-sector economy, with the emergence of the private sector that was regarded as evil
before the reform. The three sectors, government sector, SOEs and private sector, coexist
and reflect different degrees of influence of the Socialist ideology.
Among the three sectors, more women present in public sector compared to men.
This is a result of a combination of the following factors. First, the small gender earnings
gap in public sector attracts women workers. Second, public sector workers have entitled
to maternity leave and better working conditions. Conversely, private sector employees
did not enjoy such kinds of benefits until 1995 when the Labour Code was passed. The
1995 Labour Code is the first step as it formalises labour related issues, including special
provisions for women labourers in the private sector regarding the working conditions,
working hours and maternity leave etc. Third, the lack of effective monitoring system in
the public sector means fewer hours and effort required, allowing female public servants
to combine their work with their household responsibilities. That is, the over-
representation of women in public sector may reflect gender differences in preferences as
well as less discriminatory nature of the public sector after controlling for observable
characteristics.
As SOEs have been rationalised, some claim that the loss of female labour has
been faster than male labour. Some suggest that a disproportionately large number of
women are dismissed from the public sector to discrimination. However some argue that
it is merely the voluntary act of women to move into private sector, as more opportunities
have opened up during the transition.
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In sum, during the transitional phase, Vietnam has undergone structural change
with the gradual demise of SOEs in particular and the continued emergence of private
companies. What are the implications of such a structural change and the flow of female
public servants to the private sector on gender earnings differential?
Gender equality in transition
It is well established that institutional arrangements can affect females’ economic
position (Blau & Kahn 1996; Gregory 1999; Gregory & Daly 1991; Gustafsson & Li).
Under Socialism, the State introduced regulations to protect women’s rights. With the
introduction of constitutional and legal protection and through access to education, health
services and employment (Kelly 1994), women’s status in Vietnam has improved. The
basic policy of the Vietnamese Communist Party, besides introducing regulations to
protect women’s rights, were to educate people about equality between the sexes in
marriage and the labour market and balancing home and work responsibilities including
sharing housework between spouses (Fahay 1994; UNIDO 1992). Moreover, the
ideology of socialism has placed considerable emphasis on the need to liberate women.
Under socialism, women are encouraged to see their entry into the labour force as a
normal expectation for every active women, and indeed as a duty to the state and to their
families' (Molyneuz 1981:1022). Also, socialist states accept greater responsibility in the
provision of support structures for maternity and child-care, free health care and
education, housing and welfare benefits generally, serving to increase the female labour
participation rate.
In addition to the egaliterian ideology of the Socialism, the relatively balanced
gender division of labour in Vietnam than most of the developing countries may be a
result of the war (Hainsworth 1993:188). The period of war provided opportunities for
women to play prominent roles in society and in the economy, assuming important
positions in local communities, government and in the military. Women also attained a
high level of literacy and shared in the improvement in living standards.
While over two decades of Socialism has provided a constitutional and legislative
framework that promotes equity between men and women, the underlying cultural beliefs
and traditions emanating from Confucianism may remain influential. The Confucian
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tradition in the family places authority with the husband and family relations are defined
on the basis of duty which supersedes individual legal rights. For a woman this means
that her duty is as a daughter to her father, as a wife to her husband and as a mother to her
eldest son. Women’s status is lower than that of men. Sons are more valued than
daughters. One Confucian saying states: ‘A sonless woman is childless and unhappy in
life.’ Another Confucian saying is that ‘If you have a son, you can say you have a
descendant. But you cannot say so even if you have ten daughters.”
These traditional culture values may well re-emerge in Vietnam during the
transition in response to the liberalisation of the institutional arrangements under
Socialism. The emergence of private sector could create conditions for increasing gender
disparity as employers could freely choose whom to employ. Employers’ taste may
discriminate against women if the tradition values prevail and that is, employers’
preference has yet been changed over two decades of Socialism.  If that is the case, that
more women move from the public sector to the private sector may have an adverse
impact on the gender earnings differential.
3. Empirical issues
Mincerian earnings equation
I estimated conventional Mincerian log earnings functions for males and females
and also separately for the government sector, SOEs, and private sector. Labour market
experience is commonly proxied by potential experience defined by Mincer (1974)
despite the fact that interrupted experience is not accounted for. Other independent
variables include dummies on marital status, migrant status, four occupation groups
(agricultural, professional and technicians, labourers, and office workers and trade
persons), urban, region (north-south) and ethnic groups (majority-minority). Dummies of
the three sectors are included as independent variables for the estimation using the pooled
sample.
Decision of working for a particular sector may not be exogenously determined. It
may correlate with unobserved characteristics of the individual worker. This paper takes
into account the possible effect on earnings of endogenous selection into different
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sectors. For each sector, two variants of each specification are reported: one with the Hay
two-stage approach to correct for selectivity, one without.
Selectivity
Theoretically these selection biases could be dealt with using the two-stage
approach advocated by Hay (1979). This approach is a generalisation of Heckman's
approach (1979). In the first stage, a multinominal logit model is used to calculate the
correction term, lij. This correction term is then included in the earnings equation as an
additional regressor in the second stage. The predicted probability Pij from the
multinominal logit model is used to compute the correction term lij.
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where P is the probability that the individual i is in sector j.
The presence of the additional constructed selectivity correction term renders the
standard errors not correct. Note that the asymptotic covariance matrix produced by the
OLS estimation is inappropriate. They will lead to imprecise statistical inferences.
However White’s standard errors are used to give asymptotically consistent values in the
empirical work (White, 1978).3
In the empirical application, the assumption of exogenous selection into the
different sectors is relaxed.4 A multinominal logit model with three categories is
specified. They include the government sector, SOEs and private sector. Identification is
achieved by including variables, such as number of children, non- labour income, the
dependency ratio, and the dummies which captured which sector the household head is
working for and whether he or she is a migrant or not. These variables affect participation
                                                                
3 White’s method has been widely used to obtain consistant estimates of the standard errors of the
parameter estimates. See Barrett (1999), Cohen & House (1996) and Haughton & Haughton (1997).
4 Strictly speaking, there are two other sources of selectivity bias involved. One is originated from the fact
that not everyone is working. The other comes from the selective decision to engage in wage employment.
This paper focuses on the differences in returns of a wage-earner in one sector from another. Hence, these
two types of sample selection bias are dropped from the present analysis for the sake of simplicity.
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in a particular sector but not wages. In the second stage, I use the correction term lij
computed from the multinominal logit model to augment the earnings functions. The
inclusion of the correction term ensures that the OLS gives consistent estimates of the
augmented earnings functions for the three sectors.
 In interpreting the estimation of the augmented earnings equation, the
significance of the correction term, lij, indicates that the selectivity has led to biased
estimates in the OLS. A positive sign of lij signals a positive correlation between the
unobservable characteristics of an individual that influences his or her choice to work in a
particular sector and his or her earnings. A negative sign suggests a negative correlation
between the two.
Decomposing gender wage gap
Traditional decompositions: Oaxaca and Neumark
Oaxaca’s approach to estimating the gender wage gap is commonly used in the
literature. Two separate standard Mincerian log wage equations are estimated for males
and females. The Oaxaca decomposition is
ffmfmmfm xxxww )()(lnln bbb -+-=-
where mw  and fw are the means of males and females wages respectively; mx  and fx are
vectors containing the respective means of the independent variables for males and
females; and mb  and fb  are the estimated coefficients. The first term on the right hand
side captures the wage differential due to different characteristics of males and females.
The second term is the wage gap attributable to different returns to those characteristics
or coefficients. However Oaxaca’s approach is subject to the index number problem. The
decomposition results can differ depending on which reference group or which non-
discrimination wage structure is used. The gender wage gap can be decomposed in the
following way:
mfmfmffm xxxww )()(lnln bbb -+-=-
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Due to the index number problem, researchers have developed various
decompositions based on other assumed reference wage structures (Cotton 1988; Oaxaca
& Ransom 1988; Oaxaca & Ransom 1994). Neumark (1988) proposes a general
decomposition of the gender wage differential.
])()[()(lnln ffmmfmfm xxxxww bbbbb -+-+-=-
where b  is the non-discriminatory wage structure. He argues that under discrimination,
males are paid competitive wages but females are underpaid. If this is the case, the male
coefficients should be taken as the non-discriminatory wage structure. Conversely, if
employers pay females competitive wages but pay males more (nepotism), then the
female coefficients should be used as the non-discriminatory wage structure.
This decomposition can be reduced to Oaxaca’s two special cases if it is assumed
that there is no discrimination in the male wage structure i.e. b = bm, or if it is assumed
that b = bf instead. The choice of b  becomes critical. Some advocate using the pooled
sample to estimate b. Neumark shows that b can be estimated using the weighted average
of the wage structures of males and females. The first term is the gender wage gap
attributable to differences in characteristics. The second and the third terms capture the
difference between the actual and pooled returns for men and women respectively.
While Neumark decomposition is attractive, it is not immune from the common
criticism of decomposition method in general, namely, omission of variables that affect
productivity such as IQ. As a result, the gender wage gap may not automatically attribute
to discrimination or nepotism. Also, without evidence on the zero-homogeneity
restriction on employer preferences, it is not clear that the pooled coefficient is a good
estimator of the nondiscriminatory wage structure (Appleton et al. 1999). In addition, like
other conventional decomposition methods, Neumark decomposition fails to account for
differences in sectoral structures between gender groups. In Vietnam, the different
structures of the government and private sectors, and state-owned enterprises are too an
important element to ignore in understanding changes of gender wage gap during the
transition.
Full decompositions: Appleton et al. (1999)
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Brown, Moon & Zoloth (1980) first develop a decomposition method to take into
account the differences of occupational structures between gender groups. However their
method is subjected to index number problem as their decomposition bases on Oaxaca’s
method.
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where fjp and mjp denote the proportion of women and men in different sectors.
The subscripts m, f and j denote men, women and the three sectors respectively.
The first term represents the gender wage disparities attribute to intrasectoral differences.
The second term measures the different in the shares of males and females in different
sectors.
The decomposition technique developed by Appleton et al. (1999) take into
account sectoral structures. In order to avoid the index number problem, Appleton et al.
(1999) adopts an approach analogous to that of Neumark and decomposes the gender
wage gap into three components. Since this technique bases on Neumark decomposition,
it does not suffer from index number problem as Brown, Moon & Zoloth (1980) do.
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A multinominal logit model is used to specify the selection process of an
individual into different sectors. A pooled multinominal logit model and then separate
mutinominal logit models are estimated for men and women.
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By estimating a multinominal logit equation separately for men and women, we
can derive the average probability for male and female employees in different sectors.
These average probabilities are denoted by *ijp , where i = m, f and j = 1,2,3. The
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relationship between g* and gi are analogue to that of b* and b j in Neumark
decomposition.
Embedding the self-selection process, the full decomposition can be written in the
following form.
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The first three terms are equivalent to Neumark decomposition of the within-
sector wage differentials. The fourth and fifth terms measure the different earnings due to
differences in distribution of male and female employees in different sectors. The last two
terms account for differences in earnings due to differences between predicted and actual
sectoral compositions of men and women that is not accounted for by differences in
characteristics.
4. Empirical results
The Data
The data used in this study are drawn from the two rounds of Vietnam Living
Standards Survey (VLSS)5 conducted by the World Bank and the General Statistical
Office of Vietnam. The first round of survey was conducted between 1992 and 1993 --
the first of this kind of national survey ever conducted in Vietnam. It is a self-weighted
sample and it surveys 4800 households. It has been widely used for studies on the
Vietnamese economy (Desai 1995; Haughton & Haughton 1994; McDonald 1995; Pham
Dinh The 1998; Sloper & Le 1995; United Nations 1995; World Bank 1995; World Bank
1996). The second round of Vietnam Living Standards Survey was carried out between
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1997 and 1998. The sample for the 1997-98 VLSS was primarily selected from the
households selected in the original 150 communes/wards of the 1992-93 VLSS. The
sample was increased by 1200 households with these additional households obtained
from the sample of the Multi-purpose Household survey (MPHS) which was based on a
similar sampling methodology. In order to obtain sufficient sample to disaggregate results
into the seven major regions 6 for rural areas and three categories of urban domains7, the
selection of the additional households was chosen so that the total sample of 6000
households oversampled specific domains. Therefore the 1997-98 data must be weighted
in order to correct for the bias due to over-sampling.
The sample
The sample that is used in this paper is defined as follows: Wage earners who 1)
worked in the 12 months prior to the survey; 2) were aged between 18 and 60 years,
inclusive; and 3) supplied earnings data. There are 2036 wage earners in the 1992-93
sample (1173 are males and 863 are females) and 2428 wage earners in the 1997-98
sample (1408 are males and 1020 are females).
Table 1 reports the characteristics of the sample. Not many differences are found
in the data using or not using weight. Nonetheless, the discussion will focus on weighted
results.
It is apparent that females are over-represented in the public sector in both survey
periods. For instance, 53 percent of females either worked in the government sector or for
the SOEs in 1992-93, whereas only 39 percent of males were located in the same sectors.
Similar pattern is observed for the 1997-98 survey.
While females are over-represented in both survey periods, the percentage of
female employees in the public sector fell to 46 percent in 1997-98, though it remains
higher than male employees. The drop in the percentage of female public servants is
either a response to the downsizing of the public sector or a response to increasing
                                                                                                                                                                                                
5 The Vietnam Living Standards Survey is part of a series of Living Standards surveys conducted in an
increasing number of developing countries by the World Bank and the central statistical agencies. The
World Bank plans to carry out follow-up surveys on an ongoing basis.
6 The seven major regions are Northern Uplands, Red River Delta, North Central, Central Coast and
Central Highlands.
7 The three categories of urban domains are Hanoi and Hochiminh City, other cities and other urban areas.
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economic opportunities in the private sector. Table 1 also indicates that a higher
proportion of males worked for private firms in both years. Nonetheless, the proportion
of women worked as employees in the private sector during 1997-98 has risen by seven
percent from 1992-93.
On average, employees in the public sector are more educated than employees in
the private firms. As indicated in Table 1, 18 percent and 30 percent of the males and
females in the government sector have university degree or above in 1992-93. Only less
than one percent of the employees in the private sector has the same education. The 1997-
98 survey indicates that government employees are still more educated. Nonetheless, the
proportion of workers in private sector have university degree or above slightly has
increased (1.3 and 1.7 percent for males and females respectively).
In Vietnam, government controlled scholarships and decided on how many
graduates from a certain disciplines are needed to fill in government positions. These are
the reasons why employees in the public sector tend to be higher educated. Consequently,
more employees in the public sector fall into the categories of professionals and skilled
workers. In contrast to the public sector, workers in the private sector on average are less
educated and most of them have occupations required less skill.
In terms of earnings dispersion, the pooled sample in both surveys indicates that
males are paid 20-24 percent higher than female workers. A closer examination of the
data reveals that the government sector exhibits the least gender earnings disparity.
Rather, male employees in the SOEs and in the private sector are paid higher than female
employees. For instance, male workers in private firms are paid 12 percent more than
females in 1992-93. The gap has widened to 30 percent in 1997-98.
Mincerian earnings equations
The estimation of the pooled sample is presented in Table A1. Gender dummy is
found to be significant. Other things being constant, females earn less than their male
counterparts by 19 percent in 1992-93 and 25 percent in 1997-98. Employees of the
government sector are rewarded 19 percent less than those of the private sector in 1992-
93 and in 1997-98. SOEs employees receive slightly higher earnings than employees of
private firms do but the dummy variable is not significant in both years. Chow-type tests
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suggest that it would be appropriate to estimate separate earnings equations for three
sectors. 8
Tables A2-A4 report the results for the earnings equation in different sectors in
1992-93 with and without correction for selectivity. And Tables A5-A7 reports the results
for 1997-98. Notably, significant gender differences are only evident in the earnings
equation for workers in the SOEs and private sector, but not for government employees
in both survey periods. This result confirms that gender inequality is least in the sector in
which the egalitarian ideology of socialism is put into practice most. The gender earnings
gap in the government sector stays narrow, as the economy is moving further towards a
market-oriented one. The selectivity correction term is significant for private sector
workers in 1992-93 but in 1997-98, it is significant for government employees.
During 1992-93, all three sectors reward education. For instance, return to
schooling is 7.4 percent for an additional year of education in the government sector, and
5.4 percent and 2.8 percent for SOEs and the private sector respectively. Potential
experience is only found to be significant for the private sector. During 1997-98,
education is rewarded slightly less than before. The government sector and SOEs reward
an additional year of education in the same way as it did in 1992-93. Returns to schooling
4 percent for private sector compared with that in 1992-1993. In 1997-1998, potential
experience is found to be significant for both the government and private sector.
Reported also in Tables A2-A4 for 1992-93 and Tables A5-A7 for 1997-98,
gender differences are evident among government employees. Therefore earnings
equations for males and females are then estimated separately only for SOEs and the
private sector. Results are reported in Tables A8-A9 for 1992-1993 and Tables A10-A11
for 1997-1998.
Returns to schooling are found to be significant for both surveys. In general,
females reap a higher return for an additional year of education. For example, the returns
to schooling are 3.9 percent for males and 5.7 percent for females in the private sector in
                                                                
8 Chow tests were conducted on three sectoral pairs (government sector versus SOEs, government versus
private sector, and SOEs verus private sector). The F-statistics for each pair were constructed. They are
3.608, 3.659 and 1.733 respectively. The hypotheses that there are no difference in the wage structures
between government sector and SOEs is rejected at a 10 percent significant level. The same holds for
government and private sector. For SOEs and private sector, the hypothesis is rejected at a 5 percent level.
The results indicate that the earning structures differ from one sector to another.
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1992-1993. The returns for males and females show little changes for private sector
employees as well as workers in SOEs in 1997-98.
Note that the correction terms are only significant for female employees at the 10
percent level in 1992-1993. None of the correction terms are significant in 1997-1998. As
such, decomposition results reported in the section entitled “Traditional decompositions
by sectors” are based on the earnings equations without correcting for selectivity.
Decomposition of Appleton et al.
Is sectoral location important in explaining gender earnings disparities? If so, how
important? Table 2 shows the full decomposition taking into account the sectoral location
of men and women in the three sectors. The decomposition results using the unweighted
and weighted data are reported in Table 2. For the purpose of comparison with the 1992-
93 data, discussion will focus on weighted one for 1997-98.
The first three terms address the differences in returns due to within sector
differences. These three terms are just equivalent to the within sector wage gaps of the
Neumark decomposition. They indicate that deviation in male and female returns
constitute 80 percent and 129 percent of the earnings differences in 1992-93 and 1997-98
respectively are a consequence of within sector differences. Deviation in female returns is
more profound, accounting for more than half of the share in both periods. Overall,
similar patterns are evident to the Neumark results.9 Various methods point to two
observations that I could be drawn for the within sector wage disparities.
First, the gender differentials in earnings (nepotism towards men and
discrimination against women in Neumark’s terminology) are largely a result of
differences in returns to employees’ characteristics (skill differences in Neumark’s
terminology). Second, the share of gender wage gap due to differences in returns has at
least increased by two-third within the five-year period. One can conclude that both
nepotism towards men and discrimination against women is increasingly important
during the transition whereas the latter is more noticeable.
The last three terms of the full decomposition tell us what is the share of the
gender gap attributed to between sector differences. The negative sum implies that the
                                                                
9 The result of Neumark decomposition is reported in Table A12 together with Oaxaca decomposition.
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differences in sectoral locations are more favourable to women than men. The gender
earnings gap would have been 2 percent wider if men and women were equally
distributed across three sectors in 1992-93. This might be because more women relative
to men are located in the higher paying public sector where the gender earnings gap is the
smallest. As indicated in Table 1, females are over-represented in the public sector in that
survey period.
Again, a higher proportion of women is located in the higher-paying public sector
in 1997-98. Reported also in Table 2 are the decomposition results of 1997-98. The sum
of the last three terms suggests that the gender earnings gaps would have been 11 percent
wider if men and women were equally distributed across three sectors. This result implies
that sectoral allocation is more important in 1997-98 than in 1992-93. The gender
earnings differentials would have been much wider in 1997-98 than in 1992-93 than they
otherwise might be. This may be because more women have moved away from the public
sector to the private sector as the market reform continues to unfold. As Table 1 indicates
that the proportion of women employed in the private sector has risen to 53 percent
compared with 46 percent in 1992-93.
In addition, it might be that private sector employers become freer in choosing
whom to employ according to their preference which has been shaped by the traditional
Confusian values that value women less than men. Aside from the preference of
employers as suggested by the theories, the degree of marketisation may also have a role
to play. If the degree of marketisation in the private sector may yet to provide employers
strong enough incentive to place higher values on employees’ characteristics than their
own taste towards employees’ gender, then women are more likely to be discriminated
against. To further investigate why the impact of sectoral location is more important in
1997-98, I could examine three threads.
First, with employers having more autonomy to choose whom to employ, it is
suspected that the absolute gender earnings gap might widen in the private sector over
time. Second, if marketisation affects employers’ choices, it is likely to observe a rise of
the share of discrimination in the overall gender earning gap since Vietnam is still in the
early stage of marketisation. The share of discrimination is expected to be higher in 1997-
98 than in 1992-93 within the private sector. Third, the share of discrimination should
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account for more of the gender earnings gap in the private sector than among SOEs.10
Next section will investigate these issues by applying the conventional decomposition on
the separate earnings equations for the employees of SOEs and private firms.
In sum, the full decomposition accounts for the over-representation of women in
the public sector. The results imply that the increasing pace of females moving from the
public sector to the private sector would widen the gender earnings differentials. The
impact of sectoral location has become more important after a decade of implementation
of Doi Moi.
Traditional decompositions by sectors
Keeping the three threads in mind, Tables 3-4 report the conventional
decomposition results separately for SOEs and private enterprises.
First, for private sector, there is an increase of 66 percent in the absolute log
earnings gap between males and females over the five-year period after deflating the log
earnings in 1997-98.
Second, Oaxaca and Neumark decompositions suggest that regardless of which
wage structure be used, discrimination accounts for most of the gender earnings
differentials in both survey periods. More importantly, the share of discrimination has
accounted for more of the gender earnings disparities in 1997-98 than in 1992-93. From
Neumark’s interpretation, both nepotism towards men and discrimination against women
has become more important in explaining gender earnings differentials in 1997-98,
whereas the latter is more noticeable.
Third, while differences in return remain an important source of discrimination
across the private sector and SOEs, it increasingly accounts for more of the differences in
earnings between men and women in the private sector than among SOEs over time.
The results from the conventional methods and the full decomposition highlight
the dynamic of transition towards a market economy. Employers’ preference, the degree
                                                                
10 Liu, Meng & Zhang (forthcoming) found increasing gender wage differentials in absolute terms from the
state sector to the private sector in Shanghai, China but they show that the relative share of discrimination
in the overall gender wage differential declines substantially from the state to the private sector. They argue
that the decline of the relative share of discrimination is due to the degree of marketisation in the private
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of marketisation and the changing sectoral location of female workers intertwine and
adversely affect female workers.
Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper was to analyse the male-female earnings gap in
Vietnam, with special emphasis on the role of sectoral location in gender earnings
differences. I have used two surveys that were conducted in the early reform period,
1992-93, and five years after, 1997-98. These periods are also ones in which Vietnam has
been undergoing structural changes: the reduction in the size of the public sector and the
growth of the private sector that was considered as evil before market reform.  Noticeably
more and more female workers have been moving from the public sector into the private
sector. It could be a response either to the retrenchment from the public sector or to the
increasing economic opportunities in the private sector. The location aspect of gender
earnings differentials is of interest in its own right and also because of the possible
implications for gender differences in earnings.
This paper has employed Appleton et al. (1999) decomposition technique. His
method takes into account the impact of sectoral location on gender earnings differences,
whereas conventional decompositions of gender earnings differences do not take that into
consideration.
This paper yields four main conclusions: 1) Gender earnings gap due to locational
differences has been negative in 1992-93 and 1997-98. This implies that the differences
in sectoral locations are more favourable to women than men. These favourable sectoral
location differences could be attributed to the over-representation of females in the public
sector that could be a result of the non-discriminatory nature of the public sector as well
as the preferences of females. 2) Location differences are found to be more important in
1997-98 than in 1992-93. In 1997-98, the gender earnings gap would have been widened
by 11 percent if females were not disproportionately located in the public sector. 3) To
examine further why it is so, this paper applies the Oaxaca and Neumark decompositions
to earnings equations of the SOEs and the private sector. Three observations have been
                                                                                                                                                                                                
sector under which employers have an incentive to value human capital characteristics related to
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drawn. First, the absolute gender gap in log has increased in the private sector over time.
Second, both the Oaxaca and Neumark decompositions have indicated that the share of
discrimination in the private sector has increased over time. Third, the share of
discrimination has increasingly accounted for more males-females earnings gap in the
private sector than among SOEs. 4) As a result of the evidence presented above, more
women from public sector seek employment in the private sector during the transition
may have an adverse implication on the gender earnings differentials via three channels.
First, the change in distribution of females in the sectoral structure: the over-
representation of females in the public sector in which the gender earnings gap is most
narrow gradually dissipates. Second, employers are freer to choose whom to employ due
to further liberalisation and their preferences may work against females. This suggests
that more than two decades of central planning has not changed the social attitude
towards women. When such institutional arrangements have been gradually removed, the
traditional Confucian values re-emerge. Third, with the private sector still at the early
stage of development, the degree of marketisation has yet to provide strong enough
incentive for employers to reward productivity-related characteristics of employees.
                                                                                                                                                                                                
productivity more than their own taste towards the gender of their workers.
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Data Appendix
Mincerian earnings equation
Dependent variable
Hourly earnings rate of the main job over a 12 months period in logarithm. It includes
cash and in-kind payment.
Independent variables
Potential experience: Age minus years of schooling minus six (the official school
entrance age)
Potential experience2 : The square term of potential experience divided by 100
Occupation dummies: 1) Agriculture, fishery, hunting, forestry and animal husbandary:
base group; 2) Professional, technical and leaders of the Party, government, unions and
SOEs; 3) Clerical, sales and service work; 4) Skill and unskill labourers: production and
related fields, transport equipment operation, and other labouring jobs
Migrant: If a person was not born in the district that he or she was living in at the time of
the interview, the migrant dummy coded as one, zero otherwise.
Married: A person who is married, divorced, widow or widower is coded as one, zero
otherwise.
North: The North is coded as one. It includes the northern mountainous regions, Red
River Delta and the north central region. The South refers to the central coast region,
central highlands, southeast, and the Mekong Delta.
Urban: Urban area is coded as one and rural area is coded as zero.
Majority: In Vietnam, Kinh is the major ethnic group and makes up 87 percent of the
population. Minorities include Chinese, Thai, Khome, Mung, Dao, Tay, Huong, H’mong.
A person belonging to the Kinh ethnic group is coded one, zero otherwise.
Multinominal logit selection equation
Dependent variable
Three catogories: government employees, SOEs workers and private sector employees
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Independent variables
Dependency ratio: The number of household members who did not work in the previous
12 month prior to the interview to the household size.
Number of children: Number of children borne to an individual household member
Non-labour income (In thousand dong): The total annual non- labour household income
includes sources such as 1) social fund (pension, disability etc.) from the government; 2)
social subsidies from organisation and production units; 3) interest income on saving,
stock and loans; 4) claims paid by insurance; 5) gifts including those related to wedding,
funerals, and birthdays, both in cash and in kinds; 6) dowry or brideprice, inheritance; 7)
lottery winnings; 8) income from lease of buildings, equipment, houses, land, draft
animals; 9) income from lease of durable goods, every utensils; 10) income from selling
buildings, equipment; 11) income from selling vehicles; 12) sale of durable goods; 13)
sale of jewellery; 14) remittances received.
Dummy variables such as migrant, married, north, urban are defined as in the earnings
equation. Extra variables are included for identification. They are:
Household head’s sectoral location: Dummy variables for household head if his or her
main job in the previous 12 months prior to the interview is in: 1) the government sector;
2) the SOEs and cooperatives; 3) private sector. The reference group is those household
heads who was self-employed in the previous 12 month period.
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Table 1 Sample characteristics
1992-1993 1997-1998 (unweighted) 1997-1998 (weighted)
Males Females Males Females Males Females
% of individuals employed: Government 17.28 30.85 20.10 24.90 20.07 24.85
                                             SOEs 22.12 22.54 16.55 21.57 16.88 21.51
                                             Private sector 60.60 46.61 63.35 53.53 63.05 53.63
Education (percent)
     Government sector
           Primary education 5.73 16.97 6.31 2.89 5.62 2.37
           Lower secondary 13.98 17.98 17.98 18.18 19.94 19.5
           Secondary education 15.41 13.11 47.32 51.65 30.32 33.78
           Vocational education 46.24 22.1 19.56 25.21 19.68 27.51
           University 18.64 29.96 26.81 20.25 24.44 16.85
      SOEs
           Primary education 25.47 23.62 9.68 19.49 9.14 18.66
           Lower secondary 32.55 31.50 28.23 22.05 29.45 22.40
           Secondary education 11.79 11.02 28.23 31.28 27.81 32.80
           Vocational education 25.47 25.98 17.34 17.44 20.62 16.27
           University 4.72 7.87 16.53 9.74 12.98 9.87
      Private sector
           Primary education 75.34 68.21 55.78 63.63 55.95 65.31
           Lower secondary 15.85 21.95 24.04 21.05 26.10 20.58
           Secondary education 5.28 6.11 13.56 10.53 12.06 9.97
           Vocational education 3.52 2.99 4.93 2.63 4.59 2.48
           University 0.00 0.75 1.69 2.15 1.30 1.67
Mean of log wages: All -0.111 -0.354 -0.746 -0.546 0.702 0.501
                                Government -0.302 0.249 0.767 0.745 0.706 0.694
                                SOEs 0.006 -0.329 0.916 0.654 0.890 0.640
                                Private sector -0.255 -0.375 -0.693 -0.399 -0.655 -0.356
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Table 2 Full decomposition of gender wage gap
1992-1993 1997-1998
(unweighted)
1997-1998
Gap Percent Gap Percent Gap Percent
1992-1993: mWln                                -0.111
                  fWln                                -0.354 0.242
1997-1998: mWln                                -0.746
                  fWln                                -0.546 0.200
1997-1998: mWln                                 0.702
 (weighted) fWln                                 0.501 0.201
Earnings differences due to within sector
differences
    Characteristics (1) 0.050 20.85 -0.028 -13.97 -0.038 -18.50
    Deviation in male returns (2) 0.068 28.54 0.095 46.34 0.093 45.75
    Deviation in female returns (3) 0.125 52.40 0.161 78.85 0.171 83.92
Earnings differences due to between sector
(sectoral location) differences
    Characteristics   (4) + (5) -0.001 -0.41 -0.039 -19.15 -0.008 -3.95
    Deviation due to different in
      Characteristics on male sectoral location (6)
0.017 7.27 -0.006 -3.05 -0.009 -4.71
    Deviation due to different in
      Characteristics on female sectoral location (7)
-0.021 -8.66 0.022 10.97 -0.005 -2.50
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Table 3 Conventional decomposition of gender wage gap in state-owned enterprises
1992-1993 1997-1998
(unweighted)
1997-1998
Gap Percent Gap Percent Gap Percent
1992-1993: mWln                                 0.006
                  fWln                                -0.329 0.335
1997-1998: mWln                                 0.916
                  fWln                                 0.654 0.262
1997-1998: mWln                                 0.890
(weighted) fWln                                 0.640 0.250
Oaxaca
   Male wage structure
       Characteristics 0.101 30.32 0.109 41.68 0.105 42.21
       Returns 0.234 69.78 0.153 58.31 0.145 57.79
   Female wage structure
       Characteristics 0.056 16.85 0.054 20.65 0.024 9.59
       Returns 0.279 83.15 0.208 79.35 0.226 90.41
 Neumark
   Weighted wage structure
       Skill difference 0.075 22.44 0.081 30.87 0.064 25.54
       Male advantage 0.098 29.16 0.074 28.32 0.071 28.26
       Female disadvantage 0.162 48.40 0.107 40.81 0.116 46.20
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Table 4 Conventional decomposition of gender wage gap in private enterprises
1992-1993 1997-1998 (unweighted) 1997-1998
Gap Percent Gap Percent Gap Percent
1992-1993: mWln                          -0.255
                  fWln                           -0.375 0.120
1997-1998: mWln                          -0.693
                  fWln                           -0.399 0.293
1997-1998: mWln                          -0.655
(weighted) fWln                          -0.356 0.298
Oaxaca
   Male wage structure
       Characteristics 0.025 7.41 -0.078 -26.61 -0.071 -23.93
       Returns 0.307 92.59 0.371 126.61 0.370 123.93
   Female wage structure
       Characteristics 0.049       14.78 -0.077 -26.29 -0.088 -29.35
       Returns 0.283 85.22 0.370 126.29 0.386 129.35
 Neumark
   Weighted wage structure
       Skill difference 0.041 12.27 -0.077 -26.41 -0.081 -27.29
       Male advantage 0.104 31.48 0.141 48.07 0.093 31.06
       Female disadvantage 0.187  56.24 0.230 78.34 0.349 96.24
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Appendix
Table A1 Results of earnings equation (pooled sample)
1992-93 1997-98 (unweighted)
Independent variables
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
Potential experience 0.036 4.792 0.029 5.195
Potential experience2 -0.059 -3.479 -0.057 -4.649
Gender 0.190 4.208 0.254 8.647
Married 0.057 1.052 0.028 0.706
Migrant -0.047 -0.980 -0.123 -2.839
Years of schooling 0.048 5.911 0.049 8.050
Urban 0.084 1.702 0.211 3.808
North -0.472 -9.554 -0.390 -6.816
Majority -0.209 -2.716 -0.084 -1.270
Government -0.199 -2.495 -0.237 -3.691
SOEs 0.001 0.013 0.028 0.612
Professionals 0.050 0.459 0.369 2.355
Office/trade workers -0.046 -0.460 0.132 0.851
Labourer 0.152 2.147 0.155 1.052
Constant -0.878 -6.619 -0.208 -1.186
No. of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistics
1458
0.14
17.38
2431
0.22
22.06
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Table A2 Results of earnings equation for government employees in 1992-93
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Independent variables
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
Potential experience 0.006 0.395 -0.008 -0.457
Potential experience2 0.038 1.073 0.059 1.212
Gender -0.112 -1.222 0.020 0.214
Married -0.161 -1.414 -0.053 -0.412
Migrant -0.086 -1.050 -0.237 -2.411
Years of schooling 0.074 4.647 0.058 3.165
Urban -0.010 -0.120 0.022 0.202
North -0.328 -3.989 -0.243 -2.389
Majority -0.254 -1.472 -0.109 -0.796
Professionals 0.639 3.194 0.958 3.677
Office/trade workers 0.782 4.275 1.002 4.206
Labourer 0.935 4.074 1.176 4.258
Lamda 0.106 0.708
Constant -1.564 -4.978 -1.717 -4.542
No. of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistics
332
0.1729
9.34
187
0.2226
7.42
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Table A3 Results of earnings equation for SOEs employees in 1992-93
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Independent variables
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
Potential experience 0.019 1.209 0.030 1.309
Potential experience2 -0.015 -0.381 -0.034 -0.695
Gender 0.256 3.006 0.195 1.827
Married 0.109 0.988 0.013 0.076
Migrant -0.005 -0.055 -0.137 -1.139
Years of schooling 0.054 4.000 0.053 2.914
Urban 0.222 2.191 0.368 2.882
North -0.786 -8.170 -0.763 -5.981
Majority -0.267 -1.284 0.032 0.095
Professionals 0.119 0.628 0.126 0.498
Office/trade workers -0.035 -0.152 -0.200 -0.614
Labourer 0.319 1.891 0.331 1.481
Lamda 0.080 0.715
Constant -0.922 -3.238 -1.209 -2.734
No. of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistics
325
0.3032
13.52
190
0.3539
8.40
Table A4 Results of earnings equation for private sector employees in 1992-93
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Independent variables
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
Potential experience 0.050 4.281 0.055 2.942
Potential experience2 -0.094 -3.981 -0.099 -2.829
Gender 0.288 4.338 0.342 3.409
Married 0.110 1.417 -0.011 -0.084
Migrant -0.051 -0.678 -0.227 -2.147
Years of schooling 0.030 2.520 0.028 1.693
Urban 0.054 0.757 -0.041 -0.395
North -0.343 -4.298 -0.259 -2.476
Majority -0.199 -2.021 -0.217 -1.394
Professionals 0.326 1.075 0.142 0.426
Office/trade workers -0.047 -0.356 -0.178 -1.044
Labourer 0.140 1.615 0.054 0.476
Lamda -0.295 -2.272
Constant -0.949 -5.168 -0.791 -2.696
No. of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistics
801
0.1204
10.25
426
0.1195
5.1
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Table A5 Results of earnings equation for government employees in 1997-98
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Independent variables
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
Potential experience 0.041 3.927 0.031 2.665
Potential experience2 -0.067 -2.663 -0.055 -2.030
Gender 0.021 0.368 0.052 0.798
Married -0.036 -0.465 -0.049 -0.540
Migrant -0.164 -2.651 -0.167 -2.460
Years of schooling 0.078 5.724 0.067 4.009
Urban 0.185 2.095 0.239 2.334
North -0.246 -3.325 -0.247 -3.095
Majority -0.041 -0.343 0.058 0.439
Professionals -0.134 -1.143 -0.124 -0.782
Office/trade workers -0.350 -2.436 -0.417 -2.258
Labourer 0.149 0.888 0.192 0.961
Lamda 0.251 1.951
Constant -0.442 -1.820 -0.213 -0.697
No. of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistics
539
0.2465
10.5
459
0.2763
9.94
Table A6 Results of earnings equation for SOEs employees in 1997-98
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Independent variables
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
Potential experience 0.013 0.859 0.017 1.122
Potential experience2 -0.012 -0.383 -0.025 -0.758
Gender 0.183 3.265 0.184 3.213
Married 0.189 2.056 0.124 1.192
Migrant -0.224 -2.801 -0.172 -2.004
Years of schooling 0.051 4.028 0.045 3.148
Urban 0.161 1.792 0.257 2.264
North -0.537 -6.608 -0.618 -6.696
Majority -0.172 -0.941 -0.222 -0.915
Professionals 0.125 0.807 0.144 0.884
Office/trade workers -0.098 -0.680 -0.090 -0.566
Labourer -0.036 -0.298 -0.042 -0.320
Lamda 0.027 0.264
Constant 0.271 1.059 0.362 1.114
No. of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistics
455
0.332
11.15
354
0.3686
12.17
20/02/02                                                                                        Gender wage gap in transition in Vietnam
33
Table A7 Results of earnings equation for private sector employees in 1997-98
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Independent variables
Coefficients t-ratio Coefficients t-ratio
Potential experience 0.025 3.222 0.023 2.686
Potential experience2 -0.053 -3.421 -0.053 -3.186
Gender 0.387 10.010 0.387 8.022
Married 0.048 0.875 0.083 1.247
Migrant -0.051 -0.835 -0.070 -1.074
Years of schooling 0.041 5.733 0.036 4.152
Urban 0.182 2.816 0.228 3.203
North -0.427 -6.040 -0.378 -5.279
Majority -0.080 -1.087 -0.026 -0.303
Professionals 0.839 4.229 0.861 3.984
Office/trade workers 0.413 2.242 0.419 2.349
Labourer 0.248 1.465 0.269 1.703
Lamda 0.127 1.096
Constant -0.339 -1.643 -0.365 -1.815
No. of observations
Adjusted R2
F-statistics
1437
0.21
16.13
1091
0.202
10.72
Table A8 Results of earnings equation for SOEs employees in 1992-93
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Males Females Males Females
Independent variables Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
Potential experience 0.009 0.382 0.030 1.563 0.019 0.601 0.045 1.484
Potential experience2 -0.004 -0.063 -0.027 -0.599 -0.019 -0.285 -0.055 -0.896
Married 0.100 0.535 0.125 0.984 0.057 0.234 -0.127 -0.537
Migrant -0.111 -0.930 0.179 1.411 -0.230 -1.615 0.150 0.793
Years of schooling 0.044 2.368 0.061 2.654 0.050 2.133 0.059 1.807
Urban 0.146 1.062 0.327 2.523 0.335 2.020 0.378 1.944
North -0.762 -5.414 -0.827 -7.191 -0.689 -4.077 -0.858 -4.523
Majority -0.342 -1.347 0.151 0.478 0.215 0.582 -0.666 -1.897
Professionals 0.168 0.684 -0.052 -0.204 0.161 0.525 -0.366 -1.092
Office/trade workers -0.139 -0.473 -0.103 -0.342 -0.275 -0.689 -0.618 -1.397
Labourer 0.432 2.092 0.032 0.141 0.470 1.874 -0.434 -1.513
Lamda -0.136 -0.713 0.365 1.811
Constant -0.320 -0.880 -1.457 -3.648 -1.138 -2.386 0.000 0.000
No. of observations 192 136 121 72
Adjusted R2 0.2638 0.3654 0.3738 0.3533
F-statistics 7.00 8.71 (11, 124) 6.44 6.92 (11, 59)
20/02/02                                                                                        Gender wage gap in transition in Vietnam
34
Table A9 Results of earnings equation for private sector employees in 1992-93
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Males Females Males Females
Independent variables Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
Potential experience 0.050 3.359 0.026 1.351 0.048 2.194 0.041 1.325
Potential experience2 -0.083 -2.886 -0.019 -0.424 -0.079 -1.966 -0.046 -0.726
Married 0.112 1.076 0.152 1.148 -0.013 -0.076 -0.093 -0.360
Migrant -0.044 -0.493 0.219 1.657 -0.227 -1.847 0.219 1.074
Years of schooling 0.027 1.985 0.058 2.534 0.039 1.992 0.057 1.725
Urban 0.044 0.496 0.324 2.469 -0.070 -0.547 0.383 1.942
North -0.388 -4.111 -0.867 -7.329 -0.332 -2.712 -0.910 -4.543
Majority -0.184 -1.467 0.169 0.528 -0.180 -0.963 -0.600 -1.715
Professionals 0.396 1.143 -0.038 -0.145 0.184 0.465 -0.342 -1.031
Office/trade workers 0.020 0.093 -0.075 -0.248 -0.067 -0.246 -0.558 -1.281
Labourer 0.234 2.316 0.015 0.064 0.108 0.879 -0.446 -1.619
Lamda -0.151 -0.872 0.353 1.739
Constant -0.754 -3.214 -1.442 -3.593 -0.523 -1.510 -0.083 -0.120
No. of observations 526 133 299 69
Adjusted R2 0.1141 0.3751 0.0927 0.3751
F-statistics 6.08 8.72 3.02 8.72
Table A10 Results of earnings equation for SOEs employees in 1997-98
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Males Females Males Females
Independent variables Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
Potential experience -0.004 -0.203 0.017 0.807 -0.007 -0.286 0.028 1.810
Potential experience2 -0.002 -0.050 0.015 0.340 -0.005 -0.113 -0.003 -0.087
Married 0.229 1.548 0.222 2.027 0.292 1.485 0.063 0.501
Migrant -0.342 -3.628 -0.083 -0.709 -0.276 -2.329 -0.064 -0.614
Years of schooling 0.041 2.354 0.059 3.216 0.044 1.993 0.045 2.510
Urban 0.203 1.751 0.099 0.927 0.209 1.458 0.284 2.329
North -0.446 -4.135 -0.640 -6.999 -0.578 -4.941 -0.658 -6.391
Majority -0.338 -1.443 0.017 0.059 -0.472 -1.586 0.219 0.555
Professionals 0.305 1.573 -0.042 -0.194 0.314 1.437 -0.080 -0.370
Office/trade workers -0.034 -0.185 -0.150 -0.746 0.050 0.237 -0.202 -0.912
Labourer 0.109 0.665 -0.168 -1.178 0.097 0.498 -0.172 -1.185
Lamda 0.017 0.172 -0.002 -0.014
Constant 0.833 2.532 -0.036 -0.097 0.978 2.396 -0.233 -0.485
No. of observations 236 219 182 170
Adjusted R2 0.316 0.3903 0.2459 0.4501
F-statistics 6.79 10.72 5.92 7.21
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Table A11 Results of earnings equation for private sector employees in 1997-98
Without selectivity correction With selectivity correction
Males Females Males Females
Independent variables Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio Coef. t-ratio
Potential experience 0.023 2.698 0.025 2.032 0.019 2.037 0.025 1.633
Potential experience2 -0.046 -2.612 -0.056 -2.224 -0.040 -2.170 -0.062 -2.126
Married 0.076 1.320 0.008 0.087 0.103 1.554 0.054 0.453
Migrant -0.057 -0.855 -0.035 -0.340 -0.084 -1.084 -0.045 -0.417
Years of schooling 0.032 3.881 0.055 4.929 0.032 3.518 0.045 2.943
Urban 0.149 2.169 0.238 2.620 0.179 2.608 0.308 2.824
North -0.421 -6.185 -0.443 -3.733 -0.391 -5.637 -0.336 -2.527
Majority 0.031 0.421 -0.225 -1.913 0.048 0.542 -0.148 -0.982
Professionals 0.846 3.939 0.864 2.865 0.899 4.010 0.762 2.211
Office/trade workers 0.390 2.286 0.439 1.687 0.530 3.369 0.252 0.884
Labourer 0.209 1.349 0.311 1.270 0.320 2.442 0.143 0.554
Lamda 0.138 1.447 0.181 0.734
Constant 0.048 0.242 -0.371 -1.149 -0.026 -0.143 -0.225 -0.601
No. of observations 891 546 701 390
Adjusted R2 0.1835 0.2018 0.1821 0.1694
F-statistics 8.62 7.00 7.55 4.31
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Table A 12 Conventional decomposition of gender wage gap
1992-1993 1997-1998
(unweighted)
1997-1998
Gap Percent Gap Percent Gap Percent
1992-1993: mWln                                -0.111
                  fWln                                -0.354 0.243
1997-1998: mWln                                 0.746
                  fWln                                 0.546 0.200
1997-1998: mWln                                 0.702
(weighted) fWln                                 0.501 0.201
Oaxaca
   Male wage structure
       Characteristics 0.014 6.04 -0.064 -31.95 -0.067 42.21
       Returns 0.228 93.96 0.264 131.95 0.268 57.79
   Female wage structure
       Characteristics 0.086 35.65 -0.040 -19.83 -0.046 9.59
       Returns 0.156 64.34 0.240 119.83 0.248 90.41
 Neumark
   Weighted wage structure
       Skill difference 0.057 23.67 -0.050 -24.92 -0.055 -27.45
       Male advantage 0.092 38.02 0.111 55.43 0.112 55.93
       Female disadvantage 0.093 38.31 0.139 69.49 0.144 71.52
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Figures 1 and 2 show that over half of the wage workers were located in the
private sector in 1992-93. Out of 63 percent of these private sector employees were
males. During that period, 26 percent of the wage workers were employed in the
government sector. Over half of them were females. The pattern of the distribution of the
wage employees in 1997-98 is similar to that of 1992-93. Over half of the wage
employees worked for private firms and males remain the majority within private sector.
Disaggregating the data by different gender groups indicates that the representation of
females has fallen in the public sector but has risen in the private sector compared with
that in 1992-93. Summary statistics of the two samples are presented in Table 2.
[Figure 1] Distribution of wage workers in 1992-93 and 1997-98, by sector
[Figure 2] Distribution of wage workers in 1992-93 and 1997-98, by gender and
sector
Changes of gender earnings differentials
As illustrated in Table 1, for all workers, the ratio of female to male hourly
earnings ratio has been greater (from 71 percent in 1992-93 to 84 percent in 1997-98),
reflecting a decline in earnings gap observed during that five years. Earnings gap between
gender groups remain the narrower in the government sector. These changes in earnings
do not control for changes in the characteristics, such as age, experience, and education,
of  the male and female workers, changes that could affect the earnings gap.
[Table 1] Female-male earnings ratio in 1992-93 and 1997-98
Figure 1 Distribution of wage workers in 1992-92, by sector
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Figure 2 Distribution of wage workers in 1992-93, by gender and sector
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Table 1 Female-male earnings ratio, 1992-93 and 1997-98
1992-1993 1997-1998 1997-1998
(weighted)
All 0.709 0.842 0.845
Government sector 0.894 0.922 0.916
SOEs 0.583 0.758 0.758
Private sector 0.690 0.822 0.825
For SOEs, the gender differentials in log earnings have fallen by 47 percent from
0.335 in 1992-93 in absolute term between two survey periods.11 In 1992-93, the Oaxaca
method with different wage structures points to the same results: the differences in return
account for most of the gender wage gap. From Neumark’s interpretation, one can also
conclude that both nepotism toward men and discrimination against women together
accounts for most of the gender earnings differentials. Nonetheless, discrimination
                                                                
11 The author acknowledges the help of Ms. Sarah Bales, the VIE/95/043 Coordinator, in providing the
price deflator necessary for the comparison of log earnings over time.
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against women is more important in explaining the wage gap than nepotism towards men.
Similar results can be derived for 1997-98.
Note that within SOEs, the share of discrimination has fallen between 1992-93
and 1997-98 as indicated by the Oaxaca decomposition. One of the advantages of the
Neumark method over that of Oaxaca is that it allows a closer examination of the source
as it separates the male advantage from the female disadvantage. Following Neumark,
while the share due to nepotism towards men stay more or less the same, the share
accounted for by the female disadvantage falls by 8 percent. The fall in the share of
discrimination towards female is now absorbed by the rise in the share of skill differences
between men and women in 1997-98.
